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ing under the principles of due process, 
equal protection and effective assistance 
of counsel. Id. The prosecution replied 
that the purpose of the hearing was to 
permit the state to explain its use of the 
challenges and that under these circum-
stances it was not necessary to require an 
oath or cross-examination. The trial 
judge agreed and quashed the subpoena. 
Id. 
The trial judge ruled that no prima 
facie case of racial discrimination had 
been established. Id. In the interest of 
prudence, however, the court addressed 
the second step of the Batson test (that 
the state must proffer a non-discrimina-
tory explanation for the exercise of the 
challenge) and found the prosecutor's 
explanation would have been sufficient if 
a prima facie showing had been made. Id. 
Gray again appealed, and this time the 
court of special appeals upheld the lower 
court, finding that Gray had not shown 
that the ruling of the trial court had been 
clearly erroneous. Gray petitioned the 
court of appeals for certiorari, raising 
two issues: 1) whether "[t]he trial court 
erred in ruling that the defense failed to 
establish a prima facie showing of racial 
discrimination in the prosecutor's exer-
cise of peremptory challenges"; and 2) 
whether "[t]he trial court erred in refus-
ing to require the prosecutor to testify 
under oath and be subject to cross-
examination." Id. at 255, 562 A.2d at 
1281. 
Initially, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land assumed that the defendants had 
established a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination and, therefore, moved 
directly to the second issue: whether the 
prosecutor should be required to testify 
under oath and be subject to cross-
examination. /d. at 256, 562 A.2d at 
1281. The court noted that in Batson the 
Supreme Court refused to specify proce-
dures to be followed when a defendant 
objected to a prosecutor's challenges. Id. 
at 256-57, 562A.2dat 1281. The majority 
of courts that have faced the issue, how-
ever, left the procedure to the trial 
judge's discretion. The Gray court 
deemed this to be the better view, espe-
cially in light of the broad variety of 
circumstances under which a prosecutor 
may be required to offer an explanation 
and that the trial judge is to be accorded 
broad discretion in conducting a trial. Id. 
The court noted, however, one limita-
tion on the discretion of the trial judge: 
only a "compelling justification" would 
justify an ex parte proceeding sufficient 
to meet the dictates of Batson; under 
"normal" circumstances an adversary 
proceeding should be utilized to 
consider Batson challenges. Id. at 257-
58,562 A.2d at 1282. 
The court held the justifications of-
fered by the defense in support of ad-
ministration of an oath to the prosecutor 
were insufficient to remove the decision 
from the discretion of the trial judge. All 
attorneys are officers of the court, bound 
by Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct and "[a] trial judge call-
ing upon the prosecutor to explain his 
challenges has every right to expect total 
candor without resorting to the admini-
stration of an oath." Id. at 258, 562 A.2d 
at 1282. 
Examining the defendant'S right to 
cross-examine the prosecutor, the court 
noted "[i]n our adversary system of jus-
tice, cross-examination enjoys an exalted 
position." Id. at 258-59, 562A.2d at 1282. 
The court held that a judge faced with a 
request for a cross-examination in a Bat-
son situation has the discretion to grant 
the request, but only after a careful 
weighing of all the relevant factors in that 
particular case. Id. at 259, 562 A.2d at 
1282. The court, however, made clear 
that the favored procedure under these 
circumstances is not a formal adversary 
proceeding but rather a relatively infor-
mal proceeding similar to that which 
occurs during the voir dire examination 
of a juror at the bench. Id. 
Finally, the court opined that in a post-
trial hearing, as opposed to a hearing at 
the trial level, factors such as the passage 
of time and impairment of memory may 
require an explanation under oath and 
cross-examination.Id. at261, 562A.2dat 
1284. On the facts before the court, 
however, the court held that the actions 
of the trial court did not amount to an 
abuse of discretion. Id. 
The decision of the court of appeals in 
Gray has left the door open for trial 
judges to use the formalities and addi-
tional safeguards afforded by a formal 
adversarial proceeding when it is faced 
with a Batson allegation of discrimina-
tion in the selection of a jury. More 
importantly, the Gray decision pre-
serves the discretionary power of the 
trial judge to determine the proceeding 
that is best suited to the circumstances of 
the particular case before the court. 
-Greg Swain 
Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz: PRESS 
HAS COMMON lAW RIGHT OF 
ACCESS TO AFFIDAVIT 
SUPPORTING SEARCH WARRANTS 
BETWEEN EXECUTION OF 
WARRANTS AND INDICTMENT 
In Baltimore Sun Co. v. Goetz, 886 
F.2d60 (4th Cir. 1989), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
held that the press's common law right of 
access to a sealed affidavit supporting 
search warrants during the interval be-
tween execution of the warrants and in-
dictment was within the sound discre-
tion of the judicial officer. As a result, in 
certain circumstances, the press may 
force the government to unseal warrant 
papers which could expose continuing 
criminal investigations. 
On January 27, 1988, a federal magis-
trate issued three search warrants based 
on the affidavit of an FBI agent,.and then 
sealed the papers. After execution ofthe 
warrants, the magistrate unsealed the 
warrants and the returns, but left the af-
fidavit sealed. On May 4, 1988, the Balti-
more Sun Company (Sun) petitioned to 
unseal the affidavit. However, the magis-
trate denied the Sun's petition conclud-
ing that the public interest in the investi-
gation of crime would not be best served 
by allowing the Sun to publish the affida-
vit. The Sun then sought a writ of manda-
mus from the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland to com-
pel the magistrate to unseal the affidavit. 
The government offered to disclose a re-
dacted version of the affidavit, but the dis-
trict court declined. Without examining 
the affidavit, the district court agreed 
with the magistrate's conclusion and 
denied the Sun's petition. However, 
while the Sun's appeal of the district 
court's decision was pending, the magis-
trate unsealed the affidavit after indict-
ments were returned. 
After deciding that the affidavit was a 
judicial record, the court noted the supe-
rior distinction between the first 
amendment and common law rights of 
access. Only upon a showing of a 
"compelling government interest" and 
proofthat the denialis "narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest" maya court deny 
the first amendment right of access. Id. at 
64 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 
(1982». On the other hand, a court may 
at its discretion deny the common law 
right to access. Id. 
The court began its analysis with the 
question of whether the Sun had a first 
amendment right of access to the affida-
vit. The court noted that the test for 
making such a determination is: "I) 
'whether the place and process have his-
torically been open to the press and 
general public,' and 2) 'whether public 
access plays a significant positive role in 
the functioning of the particular process 
in question.'" Id. (quoting Press-Enter-
prise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,8-10 
(1986». The court held that the Sun's 
claim failed the first prong of the test 
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because the Supreme Court had twice 
held that proceedings for the issuance of 
search warrants are not open. Id. (citing 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 
(1978); United States v. United States 
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972». 
Although the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue in reference to the public, the 
court of appeals stated that "the common 
sense reason why proceedings for search 
warrants are not open to the public 
convinces us that the same principles 
apply when the press seeks disclosure." 
Id. 
After rejecting the Sun's claim of a first 
amendment right of access, the court ex-
amined the press's common law right of 
access. The court held that at common 
law the press and the public have a quali-
fied right to judicial records. Id. at 65 
(relying on Nixon v. Warner Communi-
cations, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 
(1978». "Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 41 (g) facilitates observance of this 
right by directing the judicial officer to 
file all papers relating to the search war-
rant in the clerk's office." Id. 
The court held that "the common law 
qualified right of access to warrant pa-
pers is committed to the sound discre-
tion of the judicial officer who issued the 
warrant." Id. The court noted that an 
abuse of discretion standard applied to 
the judicial officer's decision. When 
someone seeks to inspect sealed papers, 
the judicial officer may deny access if 
sealing is "essential to preserve higher 
values and is narrowly tailored to serve 
that interest." Id. at 65-66 (quotingPress-
Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 
501,510 (1984». In the instant case, the 
magistrate and the district court both 
decided that the public interest in the 
investigation of crime outweighed the 
Sun's interest in publishing the affidavit. 
However, the court of appeals noted that 
"conclusory assertions are insufficient to 
allow review; specificity is required." Id. 
at 66. Moreover, the district court failed 
to examine the affidavit. Id. 
Upon denying access to sealed papers, 
the judicial officer must consider alterna-
tives. "This ordinarily involves disclosing 
some of the documents or giving access 
to a redacted version." Id. In the instant 
case, the magistrate complied by unseal-
ing the warrants and the returns. How-
ever, the district court erroneously de-
clined the government's offer to disclose 
a redacted version of the affidavit. Id. 
The court of appeals resolved what was 
an ongoing dispute between the press 
and the government. By recognizing the 
Sun's common law right of access to the 
affidavit, the court broadened the free-
26-The Law Forum/20.2 
dom of speech and granted greater privi-
leges to the press. No longer can a judi-
cial officer rely on the government's 
position and summarily seal warrant 
papers. Rather, the judicial officer must 
exercise independent judgment in 
reaching such a decision. 
-Richard E. Guida 
Kosmas v. State: UNSOLICITED 
STATEMENT BY WITNESS 
INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE 
LIE DETECTOR TEST 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland re-
cently reversed a defendant's murder 
conviction "because the introductien of 
evidence that he refused to take a lie 
detector examination prejudiced his case 
beyond the point that an instruction to 
disregard the testimony reasonably 
could be expected to effect a cure." 
Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 589, 560 
A.2d 1137,1138 (1989). In so ruling, the 
court of appeals reversed the court of 
special appeals. Moreover, this case re-
flects the continuing trend in Maryland 
that evidence of a defendant's refusal to 
submit to a lie detector exam is inadmis-
sible and remains inadmissible even if it 
is the result of a witness's unsolicited 
"blurt out." 
Stanley Kosmas suspected his wife 
Maria was committing adultery. He hired 
a private detective, retired Baltimore City 
police sergeant Edward Mattson, to fol-
low her. In early 1985, Mattson discov-
ered Maria and her employer in a hotel 
room. Two months later, Kosmas saw his 
wife with the same man in her car. In De-
cember, 1985, Maria was discovered 
murdered within a mile of her home. 
The eldest of the Kosmas children tes-
tified that his father subjected Maria to 
verbal and physical abuse and that Kos-
mas once threatened to kill her if she left 
him.Id. at 590, 560A.2dat 1139. Mattson 
testified that Kosmas offered him 
$10,000 to murder Maria. Id. Kosmas, 
who had an excellent reputation in his 
business and home communities, denied 
these allegations. 
The case turned on Mattson's testi-
mony at trial. He testified that on Decem-
ber 20th, Maria had been missing for four 
days. That morning he went to the defen-
dant's home where he found a detective 
interviewing Kosmas. While Mattson was 
on the stand, the prosecutor asked him if 
he heard the content of the conversation 
between Kosmas and the detective. 
Mattson responded that it was "[iJust the 
typical police interview" in' which the 
detective asked Kosmas if he had seen his 
wife or knew of her whereabouts. Id. at 
592, 560 A.2d at 1140. The prosecutor 
next asked Mattson, "[a)nd then you 
talked to the defendant?" Id. Mattson 
replied, "[t)hen I talked to [Kosmas) .... 
I said, 'Would you take a lie detector?' He 
said no." [d. The defendant's attorneys 
immediately requested a mistrial. The 
trial judge denied the motion, then in-
structed the jury to ignore any testimony 
concerning a lie detector test. Id. at 591-
92, 560 A.2d at 1139-40. 
The court of appeals first noted that 
evidence that the defendant refused to 
submit to a lie detector test was inadmis-
sible. Id. at 592-93, 560 A.2d at 1140. 
Having established this premise, the 
court concentrated on the damage done 
to the defendant by the inadmissible evi-
dence and the extent to which the jury 
instruction cured this damage. Id. at 594, 
560 A.2d at 1141. As a result, the precise 
question before the court was "whether 
the prejudice to the defendant was so 
substantial that he was deprived of a fair 
trial." Id. at 595, 560 A.2d at 1141. 
The recent decision of Guesfeird v. 
State, 300 Md. 653, 480 A.2d 800 (1984), 
established factors to help answer this 
question. These factors include: 
whether the reference to a lie detec-
tor was repeated or whether it was a 
single, isolated statement; whether 
the reference was solicited by coun-
sel, or was an inadvertent and unre-
sponsive statement; whether the wit-
ness making the reference is the 
principal witness upon whom the 
entire prosecution depends; wheth-
er credibility is a crucial issue; 
whether a great deal of other evi-
dence exists; and whether an infer-
ence as to the result of the test can be 
drawn. 
Kosmas, 316Md.at594, 560A.2dat 1141 
(quoting Guesfeird, 300 Md. at 659,480 
A.2d at 803). 
The state emphasized that the lie detec-
tor test was mentioned only once and 
that this reference was unsolicited by the 
prosecutor. The court, however, re-
sponded that the state was not entirely 
blameless for this "blurt-out" because 
Mattson testified on behalf of the state. 
Id. at 595, 560 A.2d at 1141. The court 
suspected that Mattson's fifteen years as 
a police officer should have made him 
aware of the inadmissibility of his state-
ment. The court was also wary of 
Mattson's motives for disclosing this evi-
dence since he was once suspected for 
the murder. !d. at 595-96, 560 A.2d at 
1141-42. 
Nonetheless, the court was more con-
